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 CIVIL CASE APPELLATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
 (and a very few unavoidable related propositions of law) 
 Updated and Revised (current through August 3, 2007) 
 by Alan G. Gless, District Court Judge, Fifth Judicial District of Nebraska. 
 
Originally: John F. Irwin, Judge, Nebraska Court of Appeals, Standards of 
Review and Propositions of Law, Civil, Part III, in NEBRASKA INTERMEDIATE 
COURT OF APPEALS, APPELLATE PRACTICE (1992). 
 
 Introduction 
 
 Why would a district court judge write about or revise an appellate court judge’s work on 
appellate standards of review and related propositions of law in civil cases? Well, two reasons – 
a change in legal mind set and fifteen years’ worth of changes in appellate practice. First, and 
foremost, when Judge Irwin collected in a single work his 1992 Standards of Review and 
Propositions of Law, Civil, he was the first in recent Nebraska legal history to do so. Those of us 
who have used his work owe him our thanks; his contribution was invaluable to both the bench 
and bar of that time. 
 
 At that time, the Nebraska Court of Appeals had just commenced operation. Up until that 
year, the district courts, in reality, had been Nebraska’s only intermediate courts of appeals from 
the county courts, but weren’t yet conceptualized as intermediate courts of appeals when hearing 
appeals from county courts. That district courts weren’t yet seen as sitting as intermediate 
appellate courts when hearing appeals from county courts was a historical carry over from 
earlier times. 
 
 In 1972, the legislature reorganized the county courts and increased their jurisdiction, 
making them a major trial court, abolished all the various local courts (such as the justice of the 
peace courts, police courts, etc.) and relocated their jurisdiction in the county courts, and, 
transferred exclusive juvenile jurisdiction from the district courts to the county courts (outside of 
Douglas, Lancaster, and Sarpy Counties). Until 1972, appeals from county courts and the other 
local courts were tried de novo in the district courts (unless someone committed the tactical error 
of taking the judgments of the county courts and local courts to the district courts by petition in 
error). LB 1032 (1972) changed that scenario, but the mind set that district court was just a trial 
court that retried county court cases when appealed hung on for some time after 1972. 
 
 The Nebraska Supreme Court and the Nebraska Court of Appeals both have worked 
diligently to change that pre-1972 mind set. The supreme court and court of appeals 
continuously have taught that, when hearing appeals from county courts, the district courts act in 
the capacity of intermediate appellate courts. The Nebraska Supreme Court and the Nebraska 
Court of Appeals both have emphasized that, when acting as intermediate appellate courts, the 
district courts must apply the proper appellate standards of review.  
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 District courts conducting first level Administrative Procedure Act judicial reviews of 
agency actions behave more closely to their traditional trial court roles, but still must apply 
appellate standards of review. On appeal from the district courts’ APA judicial reviews, different 
appellate standards of review may apply. In hearing error proceedings, another form of appellate 
review district courts perform at the first review level, the district courts must apply a different 
set of appellate standards of review than they apply in APA cases. Thus, district court judges 
must be aware of and appreciate the operation of the applicable appellate standards of review at 
the district court level. Counsel and appellate litigants must be aware of and appreciate the 
operation of the applicable appellate standards of review at all appellate levels. 
 
 The second, and likely more obvious, reason one would update and revise Judge Irwin’s 
1992 work lies in the evolution in Nebraska’s civil appeals practice in the fifteen-plus years 
since he wrote; nearly a revolution in some areas. We’re pushing up against the end of Thomas 
Jefferson’s idea of a generation (roughly a period of nineteen years) since Judge Irwin wrote. 
Major changes have occurred in some areas of civil appellate practice. Major very recent 
changes have occurred in civil trial practice which inevitably require more changes in civil 
appellate practice. 
 
 What use should readers make of both editions of this collection? Judge Irwin did not 
offer analysis in the printed version of his edition nor do I in mine. This document should be 
used as a finding, or access, tool to locate the information collected herein, information which is 
difficult to locate in the digests and online research tools. Judge Irwin used an alphabetical 
arrangement; I have retained that organizational approach. This tool cannot be considered a 
complete collection of all of the civil appellate standards of review, no short collection could, 
but it does include many of the most frequently encountered standards. 
 
 Readers seeking analysis may want to consult: DAVID A. DOMINA, THE ROLE OF THE 
TRIAL JUDGE IN NEBRASKA APPELLATE JURISDICTION (2006); & Daniel L. Real, Appellate 
Practice in Nebraska: A Thorough, Though Not Exhaustive, Primer in How to Do it and How to 
Be More Effective, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29 (2005)(and articles cited therein); and, STEVEN 
ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW (3d ed. 1999). 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: 
 
Neb. Dept. Health & Human Serv.  Pohlmann v. NDHHS, 271 Neb. 272, 710 
N.W.2d 639 (2006).  A judgment or final order rendered by a district court in a 
judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act may be reversed, 
vacated, or modified by an appellate court for errors appearing on the record. 
McCray  v. Nebraska State Patrol, 271 Neb. 1, 710 N.W.2d 300(2006)(NSP); 
Tyson Fresh Meats v. State, 270 Neb. 535, 704 N.W.2d 788 (2005)(Neb. Dept. 
Revenue). 
 
When reviewing an order of a district court under the Administrative Procedure 
Act for errors appearing on the record, the inquiry is whether the decision 
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conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is not arbitrary, 
capricious, or unreasonable. Id. 
 
Whether a decision conforms to law is by definition a question of law, in 
connection with which an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of 
that reached by the lower court. McCray v. Nebraska State Patrol, supra; Stejskal 
v. Department of Admin. Servs., 266 Neb. 346, 665 N.W.2d 576 (2003)(NDAS). 
 
Nebraska Appeal Tribunal: In an appeal from the appeal tribunal to the district 
court regarding unemployment benefits, the district court conducts the review de 
novo on the record, but on review by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, 
the judgment of the district court may be reversed, vacated, or modified for errors 
appearing on the record. Douglas County Sch. Dist. 001 v. Dutcher, 254 Neb. 
317, 576 N.W.2d 469(1998). 
 
A presumption of validity attaches to the actions of administrative agencies. 
While the presumption is rebuttable, the burden of proof rests with the party 
challenging the agency’s action. Haven Home, Inc. v. Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 216 
Neb. 731, 346 N.W.2d 225 (1984)(now NDHHS); , 230 Neb. 747, 433 N.W.2d 
502 (1988)(Public Service Commission). 
 
An appeal to the district court of a decision by the State Personnel Board is 
reviewed on the record of the agency if the petition was filed in district court 
before July l, 1989. An appeal to the Supreme Court under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, if filed in the district court before July l, 1989, shall be heard de 
novo on the record. Nebraska Dept. of Correctional Services v. Hansen, 238 Neb. 
233, 470 N.W.2d 170 (1991). 
 
Commission of Industrial Relations. Any order or decision of the CIR may be 
modified, reversed, or set aside by the appellate court on one or more of the 
following grounds and no other: (1) if the CIR acts without or in excess of its 
powers, (2) if the order was procured by fraud or is contrary to law, (3) if the 
facts found by the CIR do not support the order, and (4) if the order is not 
supported by a preponderance of the competent evidence on the record 
considered as a whole. In an appeal from a CIR order regarding prohibited 
practices stated in § 48-824, an appellate court will affirm a factual finding of the 
CIR, if, considering the whole record, a trier of fact could reasonably conclude 
that the finding is supported by a preponderance of the competent evidence. 
Omaha Police Union Local 101, Iupa v. City of Omaha, 274 Neb. 70, ___ 
N.W.2d ___, 2007 Neb. LEXIS 120 (August 3, 2007). 
 
Any order or decision of the CIR may be modified, reversed, or set aside by an 
appellate court only on one or more of the following grounds: (1) if the CIR acts 
without or in excess of its powers, (2) if the order of the CIR was procured by 
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fraud or is contrary to law, (3) if the facts found by the CIR do not support the 
order, and (4) if the order is not supported by a preponderance of the competent 
evidence on the record considered as a whole. In an appeal from a CIR order 
regarding practices prohibited in § 48-824, the CIR’s factual findings will be 
affirmed if, considering the whole record, a trier of fact could reasonably 
conclude that the finding is supported by a preponderance of the competent 
evidence. This court will consider the fact that the CIR, sitting as the trier of fact, 
saw and heard the witnesses and observed their demeanor while testifying and 
will give weight to the CIR’s judgment as to credibility. Davis v. FOP Lodge No. 
8, 15 Neb. Ct. App. 470, 731 N.W.2d 901 (2007). 
 
AND, re APA judicial reviews geberally: when the petition instituting 
proceedings for APA judicial review is filed in the district court on or after 
July 1, 1989, the review shall be conducted by the district court without a jury de 
novo on the record of the agency. Neb. Rev. Stat, § 84-917(5)(a). 
 
AND FURTHER, when the petition instituting proceedings for review is filed in 
the district court on or after July 1, 1989, then, in the court of appeals and 
supreme court, the judgment rendered or final order made by the district court 
may be reversed, vacated, or modified for errors appearing on the record. Neb. 
Rev. Stat, § 84-918(3). 
 
When reviewing a judgment for errors appearing on the record, the inquiry 
is whether the decision conforms to law, is supported by competent evidence, and 
is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. Douglas County Sch. Dist. 001 
v. Dutcher, 254 Neb. 317, 576 N.W.2d 469 (1998). 
 
BUT, in reviewing the decision of an administrative tribunal on a petition in 
error, both the district court and the appellate court review the decision of the 
tribunal to determine whether it acted within its jurisdiction and whether the 
decision of the tribunal is supported by sufficient relevant evidence. Maxon v. 
City of Grand Island, 273 Neb. 647, 731 N.W.2d 882 (2007). 
 
 See also ZONING. 
 
Department of Natural Resources. In an appeal from DNR, an appellate court’s 
review of the director’s factual determinations is limited to deciding whether such 
determinations are supported by competent and relevant evidence and are not 
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; however, on questions of law, which 
include the meaning of statutes, a reviewing court is obligated to reach its 
conclusions independent of the legal determinations made by the director. In re 
Applications T-851 and T-852. Nebraska Public Power District v. Department of 
Natural Resources, 268 Neb. 620; 686 N.W.2d 360 (2004); & In re Water 
Appropriation A-4924, 267 Neb. 430, 674 N.W.2d 788 (2004). 
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When a judgment is attacked in a manner other than by proceeding in the original 
action to have it vacated, reversed, or modified, or by a proceeding in equity to 
prevent its enforcement, the attack is a collateral attack. In re Applications T-
851 and T-852. Nebraska Public Power District v. Department of Natural 
Resources, 268 Neb. 620; 686 N.W.2d 360 (2004). 
 
Administrative agency decisions determining water rights pursuant to statutory 
authority involve the exercise of quasi-judicial powers, and when no appeal is 
taken from such a decision, it becomes a final and binding adjudication. Id. 
 
Judgments rendered by administrative agencies acting in a quasi-judicial capacity 
are not subject to collateral attack if the agency had jurisdiction over the parties 
and the subject matter. Id. 
 
Error without prejudice provides no ground for appellate relief. Id. 
 
On appeal from a decision of the Department of Water Resources (now 
Department of Natural Resources), this court is to “search only for errors 
appearing in the record.” In re Applications T-61 and T-62, 232 Neb. 316, 323, 
440 N.W.2d 466, 471 (1989). 
 
Under this standard of review, our inquiry is limited to determining whether the 
decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent and relevant evidence, 
and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. In re Appropriations D-877 
and A-768, 240 Neb. 337, 482 N.W.2d 11(1992). 
 
In reviewing the orders of administrative agencies, it is the practice of this court 
to consider constitutional questions when raised on direct appeal. In re 
Appropriations D-887 and A-768, 240 Neb. 337,482 N.W.2d 11(1992).  (Citing 
Metropolitan Utilities Dist. v. Merritt Beach Co.,179 Neb. 783, 140 N.W.2d 626 
(1966). 
 
ADVISORY OPINIONS: 
 
This court does not render advisory opinions, but simply decides cases and 
controversies. Gas ‘N Shop, Inc. v. State of Nebraska, 234 Neb. 309, 451 N.W.2d 
81 (1990). 
 
AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS: 
 
The right to amend pleadings rests within the sound discretion of trial court and 
allowing amendment will not be error unless prejudice resulted through 
amendment changing issues and affecting quantum of proof as to any material 
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fact. Thomas v. Marvin E. Jewell & Co. , 232 Neb. 261, 440 N.W.2d 437 (1989). 
 
But, query, this old rule may or may not have survived the adoption of the Neb. 
R. Pldg. in Civ. Actions and the repeal of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-852, upon which 
that rule was based. No published appellate cases yet, and, although the theory of 
the new rules includes the liberalization of such rules, they may not liberalize 
amendment of pleadings. 
 
For example, [a]lthough Neb. Ct. R. of Pldg. in Civ. Actions 15 provides 
authority for the trial court to allow amendment after a responsive pleading has 
been filed, rule 15(a) specifies that such may be done “only by leave of court or 
by written consent of the adverse party”; there is no specific rule in the new rules 
of pleading comparable to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-854, providing a right to amend if 
the court sustains a challenge to the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted. Dennes v. Dunning, 14 Neb. Ct. App. 934, 719 
N.W.2d 737 (2006). 
 
AND SEE, R. 15(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. When issues not 
raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they 
shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the 
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any 
time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the 
trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is 
not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to 
be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court 
that the admission of such evidence would prejudice the party in maintaining the 
party’s action or defense upon the merits. The court may grant a continuance to 
enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
 
ANSWER: 
 
All material allegations of new matter contained in an answer are admitted if no 
reply is made to them. Landon v. Pettijohn, 231 Neb. 837, 438 N.W.2d 757 
(1989). 
 
 However, that rule was based on Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-842, and: 
  
For purposes of this action, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-842 (Reissue 1995) (repealed 
operative January 1, 2003) provided in part that “every material allegation of new 
matter in the answer not controverted by the reply, shall, for the purposes of the 
action, be taken as true.” We have said that the failure to file a reply 
controverting a new allegation raised in an answer to a petition results in the 
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allegation’s being taken as true. Nelson v. City of Omaha, 256 Neb. 303, 589 
N.W.2d 522 (1999); Landon v. Pettijohn, 231 Neb. 837, 438 N.W.2d 757 (1989). 
 
 
 
Applicable to all civil actions filed on or after January 1, 2003: 
 
 Rule 7. Pleadings Allowed; Form of Motions:  
 
(a)  Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a 
counterclaim denominated as such, if the answer contains a counterclaim; an 
answer to a cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross-claim; a third-party 
complaint, if a person who was not an original party is summoned as a third-party 
defendant; and a third-party answer, if a third party complaint is served. No other 
pleading shall be allowed, except that the court may order a reply to an answer 
or a third-party answer. (Italics added). 
 
Comment.. -- The initial pleading will be a petition when that designation is 
provided by statute. See § 25-801.01(2)(b). . . . 
 
 Rule 8. General Rules of Pleading: 
 . . .  
(d)  Effect of Failure to Deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive 
pleading is required, other than those as to value or the amount of damage, are 
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to 
which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as denied or 
avoided. 
 
APPEALABLE FINAL ORDERS: 
 
Final order, defined. An order affecting a substantial right in an action, when 
such order in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment, and an order 
affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding, or upon a summary 
application in an action after judgment, is a final order which may be vacated, 
modified or reversed, as provided in this chapter. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902. 
 
Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate 
court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it. For an 
appellate court to acquire jurisdiction of an appeal, there must be a final order 
entered by the court from which the appeal is taken; conversely, an appellate 
court is without jurisdiction to entertain appeals from nonfinal orders. An order is 
final for the purposes of appeal if it affects a substantial right and (1) determines 
the action and prevents a judgment, (2) is made during a special proceeding, or 
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(3) is made on summary application in an action after judgment is rendered. Pfeil 
v. State, 273 Neb. 12, 727 N.W.2d 214 (2007). 
 
For the purposes of § 25-1902, a special proceeding includes every special 
statutory remedy which is not in itself an action. Webb v. American Employers 
Group, 268 Neb. 473, 684 N.W.2d 33 (2004). A judgment rendered by the 
district court that is merely a step or proceeding within the overall action is not a 
special proceeding. Id. A special proceeding which affects a substantial right is, 
by definition, not part of an action. Id. Generally, a “special proceeding,” within 
the meaning of § 25-1902, entails civil statutory remedies not encompassed in 
chapter 25 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes. Keef v. State, 262 Neb. 622, 634 
N.W.2d 751 (2001). Examples of special proceedings include juvenile court 
proceedings, Rebecca B. v. Sandra B. (In re Rebecca B.), 260 Neb. 922, 621 
N.W.2d 289 (2000); probate actions, In re Estate of Peters, 259 Neb. 154, 609 
N.W.2d 23 (2000); and workers’ compensation cases, Thompson v. Kiewit 
Constr. Co., 258 Neb. 323, 603 N.W.2d 368 (1999). Id. 
 
Actions brought under the State Tort Claims Act are not special proceedings 
within the meaning of § 25-1902. Id. 
 
Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902, neither the Nebraska Court of Appeals nor 
the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to address the inmate's issues on appeal 
relating to order of adjudication of mentally ill and dangerous because the inmate 
did not appeal the district court’s finding that the order of adjudication was not a 
final order. When a lower court lacks the authority to exercise its subject matter 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of a claim, issue, or question, an appellate 
court also lacks the power to determine the merits of the claim, issue, or question 
presented to the lower court. State v. Michael U. (In re Michael U.), 273 Neb. 
198, 728 N.W.2d 116 (2007). 
 
Appellate court lacked jurisdiction over an appeal from the trial court’s summary 
judgment for the State because there had been no adjudication of the State’s 
third-party claim against the highway construction company and the trial court 
had not made the express determination and the express direction as required 
under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315(1) to enter judgment on the injured motorist’s 
claim against the State. Malolepszy v. State, 270 Neb. 100, 699 N.W.2d 387 
(2005). 
 
Where the transcript of a district court proceeding did not contain an entry of 
judgment on a jury verdict prior to the filing, the filing and denial, of a motion for 
new trial were premature and null, so the Nebraska Supreme Court did not have 
appellate jurisdiction. Macke v. Pierce, 263 Neb. 868, 643 N.W.2d 673 (2002). 
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Where the judge failed to make a written notation of the relief granted or denied 
in compliance with the 1999 amendment to this section, the clerk was unable to 
enter a judgment and the appeal had to be dismissed. Mumin v. Hart, 9 Neb. App. 
404, 612 N.W.2d 261 (2000). 
 
Court orders are to be in writing, containing the relief granted or the order made. 
State v. Wayne H., 8 Neb. App. 225, 590 N.W.2d 421 (1999). 
 
File-stamped November 22, 2004, journal entry was a judgment because it 
resolved all issues raised in a city’s declaratory action and the November 30 
notice of appeal challenging that judgment constituted a timely appeal. Although 
the order of permanent injunction complicates the jurisdictional analysis, its entry 
on December 6 did not defeat the finality of the November 22 ruling from which 
the notice of appeal was explicitly taken. City of Ashland v. Ashland Salvage, 
Inc., 271 Neb. 362, 711 N.W.2d 861 (2006). 
  
Appeal of property award following divorce was ordered dismissed because the 
trial court’s order failed to resolve the property distribution by failing to distribute 
the marital home. It was not a final order as the substantial rights of the parties 
concerning their property distribution remained undetermined. Harvey v. Harvey, 
14 Neb. Ct. App. 380, 707 N.W.2d 444 (2005). 
 
Judgment is a court’s final consideration of the respective rights and obligations 
of the parties to an action as those rights exist at that time. Metco, Inc. v. 
Huffman, 2 Neb. Ct. App. 506, 511 N.W.2d 780 (1994). 
 
Trial court’s alleged orders purporting to reinstate cases after they had been 
dismissed were a nullity, because the alleged orders were neither signed by the 
trial judge nor filed and stamped by the clerk. Murray Constr. Servs., Inc. v. 
Meco-Henne Contracting, Inc., 10 Neb. Ct. App. 316, 633 N.W.2d 915 (2001). 
 
Appellate court erred by dismissing an appeal from a divorce case as untimely 
because a journal entry that stated the terms of a subsequent order did not 
determine the rights of the parties since it left certain issues unresolved; therefore, 
it was not a final judgment in the case. Hosack v. Hosack, 267 Neb. 934, 678 
N.W.2d 746 (2004). 
 
The practice of a trial court’s filing a journal entry which describes an order that 
is to be entered at a subsequent date is disapproved. The confusion presented by 
this case can be avoided if trial courts will, as they should, limit themselves to 
entering but one final determination of the rights of the parties in a case. The 
filing of both a journal entry and a subsequent order creates the potential for 
confusion. Instead, the trial court should notify the parties of its findings and 
intentions as to the matter before the court by an appropriate method of 
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communication without filing a journal entry. The trial court may thereby direct 
the prevailing party to prepare an order subject to approval as to form by the 
opposing party. Only the signed final order should be filed with the clerk of the 
court. Hosack v. Hosack, 267 Neb. 934, 678 N.W.2d 746 (2004). 
 
In absence of judgment or order finally disposing of case, Supreme Court has no 
authority or jurisdiction to act, and in absence of such judgment or order the 
appeal will be dismissed. Larsen v. Ralston Bank, 236 Neb. 880, 464 N.W.2d 329 
(1991). 
Order is final and appealable when substantial rights or parties to action are 
determined, even though cause is retained for determination of matters incidental 
thereto. In re 1983-1984 County Tax Levy by Box Butte County Bd. of 
Equalization, 220 Neb. 897, 374 N.W.2d 235 (1985). 
 
Because no specific sums for child support were included in the trial court’s order 
modifying an earlier paternity and custody decree, and because the rights and 
liabilities of the parties could not be ascertained without going beyond the record, 
the order was not a final, appealable order. Accordingly, the father’s appeal of the 
trial court’s order was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Goeser v. Allen, 14 Neb. 
Ct. App. 656, 714 N.W.2d 449 (2006). 
 
Appointment of a receiver is an appealable final order.  Nebraska Nutrients, Inc. 
v. Shepherd, 261 Neb. 723, 626 N.W.2d 472 (2001); Dickie v. Flamme Bros., 251 
Neb. 910, 560 N.W.2d 762 (1997). 
 
Denial of a motion to compel arbitration is a final, appealable order. Webb v. 
American Employers Group, 268 Neb. 473, 482, 684 N.W.2d 33 (2004). 
 
APPEALABLE NON-FINAL (i.e., interlocutory) ORDERS – Collateral Order Appeal 
Doctrine: 
 
This court most recently explained the collateral order doctrine in Hallie Mgmt. 
Co. v. Perry, 272 Neb. 81, 718 N.W.2d 531 (2006). In that case, we noted that 
this court had previously adopted the collateral order doctrine, Richardson v. 
Griffiths, 251 Neb. 825, 560 N.W.2d 430 (1997), an exception to the final order 
rule which was announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial 
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). We noted with approval the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s pronouncement of the doctrine and held that for an order to fall within the 
doctrine, it must (1) conclusively determine the disputed question, (2) resolve an 
important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) be 
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Hallie Mgmt. Co. v. 
Perry, supra. 
 
  
-11-
Appeal of an order granting a motion to disqualify counsel. [I]f the appeal from 
an order of disqualification involves issues collateral to the basic controversy and 
if an appeal from a judgment dispositive of the entire case would not be likely to 
protect the client’s interests, interlocutory review is appropriate. Richardson v. 
Griffiths, 251 Neb. 825, 560 N.W.2d 430 (1997). But see, especially, Hallie 
Mgmt. v. Perry, 272 Neb. 81, 718 N.W.2d 531 (2006). 
 
ARBITRARY & CAPRICIOUS AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE DEFINED: 
 
Arbitrary and capricious action is defined with reference to administrative 
agencies as action taken, in disregard of the facts or circumstances of the case, 
without some basis which would lead a reasonable and honest person to the same 
conclusion. The court does not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court 
regarding matters of evidence such as credibility of the witnesses or disputes and 
conflicts in testimony of the witnesses. Rather, the court reviews the evidence to 
determine if the evidence is sufficient to support the decision of the agency and 
the action taken. The tribunal conducting the hearing is more able to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses and evaluate the evidence submitted at the hearing. 
Thus, the court needs to determine if competent evidence supports the 
determination of the agency. Competent evidence has been defined as evidence 
that tends to establish the fact in issue. Wagner v. City of Omaha, 236 Neb. 843, 
464 N.W.2d 175 (1991). 
 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOT DISCUSSED: 
 
Errors must be assigned and argued in the party’s brief to be considered by an 
appellate court. See, In re Interest of A.C., 239 Neb. 734, 478 N.W.2d 1 (1991) 
(errors assigned but not argued will not be considered by appellate court); In re 
Interest of B.M., 239 Neb. 292, 475 N.W.2d 909 (1991) (errors which are argued 
on appeal but not assigned will not be considered by appellate court). However, 
we have conducted a review for plain error of the district court’s order affirming 
the Board’s order of final disposition. Finding no plain error by the district court, 
we affirm. Saville v. Burt County Mental Health Bd. (In re Saville), 10 Neb. Ct. 
App. 194, 626 N.W.2d 644 (2001). 
 
To be considered by the Supreme Court, an error must be assigned and discussed 
in the brief of one claiming that prejudicial error has occurred. Carlson v. 
Zellaha, 240 Neb. 432,N.W.2d(1992); State v. Melton, 239 Neb. 576, 477 
N.W.2d 154 (1991); In re Interest of B.M., 239 Neb. 292, 475 N.W.2d 909 
(1991); Chambers-Dobson. Inc. v. Squier, 238 Neb. 748, 472 N.W.2d 391 (1991). 
 
The Supreme Court, in reviewing the decisions of the district court which 
affirmed, reversed, or modified decisions of the county court, will consider only 
those errors specifically assigned in the appeal to the district court and again 
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assigned as error in the appeal to the Supreme Court. State v. Nowicki, 239 Neb. 
130, 474 N.W.2d 478 (1991). 
 
[T]he defendant did not specifically assign any errors in his appeal to the district 
court. Therefore, absent plain error appearing on the record, there is nothing for 
this court to review on appeal. State v. Keller, 240 Neb. 566, 483 N.W.2d 126 
(1992). 
 
 
 
 
AND FURTHER,  
 
Neb. Ct. R., Unif. Dist. Ct. R. 18: Statement of errors. Within 10 days of filing 
the bill of exceptions in an appeal to the district court, the appellant shall file with 
the district court a statement of errors which shall consist of a separate, concise 
statement of each error a party contends was made by the trial court. Each 
assignment of error shall be separately numbered and paragraphed. Consideration 
of the cause will be limited to errors assigned and discussed, provided that the 
district court may, at its option, notice plain error not assigned. This rule shall not 
apply to small claims appeals. (Last amended November 18, 1998).  
 
Neb. Ct. R., Cty. Ct. R. 52(I)(G): Statement of errors.  Within 10 days of the 
filing of the bill of exceptions in the district court, the appellant shall file with the 
district court a statement of errors, which shall consist of a separate, concise 
statement of each error a party contends was made by the trial court. Each 
assignment of error shall be separately numbered and paragraphed. Consideration 
of the case will be limited to errors assigned and discussed. The district court 
may, at its option, notice a plain error not assigned. This rule shall not apply to 
small claims appeals. (Last amended Oct. 27, 1993). 
 
ATTORNEY FEES/GUARDIAN AD LITEM FEES: 
 
A trial court’s decision awarding or denying attorney fees will be upheld on 
appeal absent an abuse of discretion. In considering a trial court's order 
concerning the payment of guardian ad litem fees, the allowance, amount, and 
allocation of guardian ad litem fees is a matter within the initial discretion of a 
trial court, involves consideration of the equities and circumstances of each 
particular case, and will not be set aside on appeal in the absence of an abuse of 
discretion by the trial court. John P. v. Paula P. (In re Karin P.), 271 Neb. 917, 
716 N.W.2d 681 (2006). 
 
BENCH TRIAL: 
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In a bench trial of a law action, the court, as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of 
the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Kumar v. 
Douglas County,, 234 Neb. 511, 452 N.W.2d 21 (1990). 
 
Among the factors entering into the trial court’s resolution of any conflicts of 
evidence are such items as the respective interests of the parties in the litigation; 
the demeanor of witnesses, including the parties, while testifying before the 
court; the apparent fairness exhibited by witnesses; the extent to which the 
testimony of various witnesses is corroborated; and the reasonableness or 
unreasonableness of testimony from the witnesses. Ohnstad v. Omaha Public 
School District, 232 Neb. 788, 442 N.W.2d 859 (1989). 
 
In reviewing a judgment awarded in a bench trial, the Supreme Court does not 
reweigh evidence but considers the judgment in the light most favorable to the 
successful party and resolves evidentiary conflicts in favor of the successful 
party, who is entitled to every reasonable inference deducible from the evidence. 
City of LaVista v. Andersen, 240 Neb. 3, 480 N.W.2d 185 (1992); Nebraska 
Builders Prod. Co. v. Industrial Erectors, 239 Neb. 744, 478 N.W.2d 257 (1992); 
Metropolitan Util. Dist. of Omaha v. Pelton,236 Neb. 66, 459 N.W.2d 193 
(1990). 
 
In a bench trial of law action, trial court’s factual findings have effect of jury 
verdict and will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly wrong. City of 
LaVista v. Andersen, 240 Neb. 3, 480 N.W.2d 185 (1992); Nelson-Hoist v. 
Iverson, 239 Neb. 911, 479 N.W.2d 759 (1992) ; Nebraska Builders Prod. Co. v. 
Industrial Erectors, 239 Neb. 744, 478 N.W.2d 257 (1992). 
 
In a bench trial, it is presumed that the trial court considered only relevant and 
admissible evidence, and disregarded any irrelevant evidence. State v. Dillon, 222 
Neb. 131, 382 N.W.2d 353 (1986); Gibson v. City of Lincoln, 221 Neb. 304, 376 
N.W.2d 785 (1985). 
 
A district court’s findings of fact in a proceeding under the State Tort Claims act, 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-8,209 et seq. (Reissue 1996), will not be set aside unless 
such findings are clearly erroneous. Fickle v. State, 273 Neb. 990, ___ N.W.2d 
___, 2007 Neb. LEXIS 113 (July 20, 2007). 
 
CONDITIONAL OR FUTURE ORDERS: 
 
We have often and recently stated that a “judgment” is a court’s final 
consideration and determination of the respective rights and obligations of the 
parties to an action as those rights and obligations presently exist. State ex rel. 
Stenberg v. Moore, 258 Neb. 199, 602 N.W.2d 465 (1999). A conditional 
judgment is wholly void because it does not “perform in praesenti” and leaves to 
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speculation and conjecture what its final effect may be. Id. We have also stated 
that orders which specify that a trial court will exercise its jurisdiction based upon 
future action or inaction by a party are conditional and are therefore not 
appealable. Deuth v. Ratigan, 256 Neb. 419, 590 N.W.2d 366 (1999). 
 
The confusion in this area of the law, if any exists, may stem from those cases in 
which this court has broadly stated that “conditional orders purporting to 
automatically dismiss an action upon a party’s failure to act within a set time are 
void as not performing in praesenti, and thus have no force or effect.” (Emphasis 
supplied.) Schaad v. Simms, 240 Neb. 758, 760, 484 N.W.2d 474, 475 (1992). A 
careful reading of the cases in which we have so stated reveals that such language 
stands for the proposition that conditional orders have no force and effect as a 
final order or a judgment from which an appeal can be taken. See, e.g., State ex 
rel. Stenberg v. Moore, supra; Deuth v. Ratigan, supra; Schoneweis v. Dando, 
231 Neb. 180, 435 N.W.2d 666 (1989); Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Johnson, 
226 Neb. 877, 415 N.W.2d 478 (1987); Lemburg v. Adams County, 225 Neb. 
289, 404 N.W.2d 429 (1987). The cases in which this proposition is generally 
relied upon are those in which an order was entered by the trial court purporting 
to dismiss a case upon the occurrence of some future event. Thus, a correct 
statement of the proposition is that conditional orders that do not perform in 
praesenti have no force and effect as a final order or judgment from which an 
appeal can be taken. Custom Fabricators of Granite & Marble, Inc. v. 
Lenarduzzi, 259 Neb. 453, 610 N.W.2d 391 (2000). 
 
CONFLICT IN THE EVIDENCE: 
 
Where the evidence is in conflict, we give weight to the fact that the trial judge 
heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather 
than another. Miles v. Miles, 231 Neb. 782, 438 N.W.2d 139 (1989). 
 
CONSTITUTIONALITY: 
 
In examining the validity of a legislative act, all reasonable doubts must be 
resolved in favor of its constitutionality. Landon v. Pettijohn, 231 Neb. 837, 438 
N.W.2d 757 (1989). 
 
A party claiming a statute is unconstitutional has the burden to show and clearly 
demonstrate that the questioned statute is unconstitutional. Spilker v. City of 
Lincoln, 238 Neb. 188, 469 N.W.2d 546 (1991). 
 
In every constitutional challenge, there attaches the presumption that all acts of 
the legislature are constitutional, with all reasonable doubts resolved in favor of 
constitutionality. In reviewing a statute, a court does not pass judgment on the 
wisdom or the necessity of the legislation or whether the statute is based upon 
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assumptions which are scientifically substantiated. Even misguided laws may 
nevertheless be constitutional. Therefore, the court’s inquiry under equal 
protection analysis is not whether it agrees with the wisdom or necessity of the 
law, but whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
interest. Le v. Lautrup, 271 Neb. 931, 716 N.W.2d 713 (2006). 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION: 
 
Neb. Ct. R. Prac. 9E (rev. 2001) requires that a party presenting a case involving 
the constitutionality of a statute must file and serve notice with the Supreme 
Court Clerk at the time of filing the party's brief. State v. Johnson, 269 Neb. 507, 
695 N.W.2d 165 (2005). Rule 9E also provides that if the Attorney General is not 
already a party to the action, a copy of the brief assigning unconstitutionality 
must be served on the Attorney General within 5 days of the filing of the brief 
with the Supreme Court Clerk. A review of the record in this case reveals that 
Ptak failed to file a notice of a constitutional question and failed to serve upon the 
Attorney General, who is not a party to this action, a copy of his brief. Ptak v. 
Swanson, 271 Neb. 57, 709 N.W.2d 337 (2006). 
 
This court has repeatedly held that strict compliance with rule 9E is required for 
the court to address a constitutional claim. Id., citing: State v. Feiling, 255 Neb. 
427, 585 N.W.2d 456 (1998) (refusing to consider constitutional question where 
record contained no separate written notice as required by rule 9E); State v. 
McDowell, 246 Neb. 692, 522 N.W.2d 738 (1994) (holding this court will not 
consider constitutional challenge where appellant failed to strictly comply with 
rule 9E). See, also, In re Interest of Rebecka P., 266 Neb. 869, 669 N.W.2d 658 
(2003); Mid City Bank v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal., 260 Neb. 282, 616 N.W.2d 
341 (2000); In re Application of SID No. 384, 259 Neb. 351, 609 N.W.2d 679 
(2000); Zoucha v. Henn, 258 Neb. 611, 604 N.W.2d 828 (2000); In re Adoption 
of Kassandra B. & Nicholas B., 248 Neb. 912, 540 N.W.2d 554 (1995); Proctor 
v. Minnesota Mut. Fire & Cas., 248 Neb. 289, 534 N.W.2d 326 (1995); State v. 
Melcher, 240 Neb. 592, 483 N.W.2d 540 (1992); Holdrege Co-op Assn. v. 
Wilson, 236 Neb. 541, 463 N.W.2d 312 (1990). 
 
CONTEMPT: 
 
We have . . . distinguished between contempt sanctions which are coercive in 
nature and those which are punitive in nature; that is to say, between those which 
aim to compel future obedience to the court’s orders and decrees and are 
therefore coercive, and those which punish past disrespectful or contumacious 
conduct and vindicate the court’s authority. In the coercive sanction, . . . the 
contemner holds the keys to his jail cell, in that the sentence is conditioned upon 
his continued noncompliance. The punitive sanction is much like the sentence in 
a criminal case, in that it is absolute and not subject to mitigation if the contemner 
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alters his future conduct toward the court, and takes on the aspects of a final order 
or of an order affecting a substantial right issued in a special proceeding, both of 
which are reviewable on appeal. . . . The coercive sanction, on the other hand, is 
always subject to modification by the contemner’s conduct; that sanction is not 
final in any sense. Therefore, punitive sanctions are reviewable by appeal; 
whereas coercive sanctions can only be attacked collaterally by habeas corpus. 
Smeal Fire Apparatus Co. v. Kreikemeier, 271 Neb. 616, 715 N.W.2d 134 
(2006). 
 
CONTINUANCE: 
 
A motion for continuance is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. Keithley 
v. Black, 239 Neb. 685, 477 N.W.2d 806 (1991). 
 
BUT SEE: Weiss v. Weiss, 260 Neb. 1015, 620 N.W.2d 744 (2001)(The trial 
court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for a continuance, 
because appellant had requested no other continuances in the case, and there was 
no intent by appellant to unnecessarily delay the proceedings. 
 
 
CROSS-EXAMINATION: 
 
The trial judge first called Michael to testify and, at the conclusion of the 
questioning, refused to allow Denise’s counsel to cross-examine Michael. The 
trial judge then called Denise to testify and refused to give Denise’s counsel an 
opportunity to examine Denise after the trial judge’s interrogation. The denial of 
Denise’s counsel’s requests certainly chilled any thoughts Michael might have 
had, as pro se, to cross-examine Denise. As such, Michael’s rights to cross-
examine Denise under § 27-614 were violated. 
 
While we hold that under § 27-614(1) parties have the right to cross-examine 
witnesses called by a judge, we also note that a ruling regarding the extent, scope, 
and course of the cross-examination rests within the discretion of the trial  court 
and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Elstun v. Elstun, 257 
Neb. 820, 600 N.W.2d 835 (1999); Rahmig v. Mosley Machinery Co., 226 Neb. 
423, 412 N.W.2d 56 (1987); Nixon v. Harkins, 220 Neb. 286, 369 N.W.2d 625 
(1985). 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS: 
 
An action for declaratory judgment under the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-
21,149 et seq. (Reissue 1995) is sui generis; whether such action is to be treated 
as one at law or one in equity is to be determined by the nature of the dispute. 
JLDI and MWRC's petition in this case seeks an injunction, whereas Central's 
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cross-petition seeks a declaration that the leases are void. An action for injunction 
sounds in equity. A suit on a contract is an action at law. Thus, while JLDI and 
MWRC's petition is an action in equity, Central's cross-petition is an action at 
law. 
 
In an appeal of an equitable action, an appellate court tries factual questions de 
novo on the record and reaches a conclusion independent of the findings of the 
trial court, provided, where credible evidence is in conflict on a material issue of 
fact, the appellate court considers and may give weight to the fact that the trial 
judge heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts 
rather than another. 
 
In connection with questions of law and statutory interpretation, an appellate 
court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the 
decision made by the court below. Jeffrey Lake Dev., Inc. v. Cent. Neb. Pub. 
Power & Irrigation Dist., 262 Neb. 515, 633 N.W.2d 102 (2001); In re Estate of 
Tvrz, 260 Neb. 991, 620 N.W.2d 757 (2001); Snyder v. EMCASCO Ins. Co., 259 
Neb. 621, 611 N.W.2d 409 (2000). 
 
In a declaratory judgment action treated as an action at law, we do not disturb 
factual determinations unless they are clearly wrong. Glad Tidings Assembly of 
God v. Nebraska District Council of the Assemblies of God, Inc., 273 Neb. 960, 
___ N.W.2d ___, 2007 Neb. LEXIS 110 (July 13, 2007); Spanish Oaks v. Hy-
Vee, 265 Neb. 133, 655 N.W.2d 390 (2003).  
 
A declaratory judgment action to construe a statute presents a question of law. 
State Bd. of Ag. v. State Racing Comm., 239 Neb. 762, 478 N.W.2d 270 (1992). 
 
DEMURRER (rest in peace - succeeded by R. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss) 
 
 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-801.01(2)(c): 
 
 For all civil actions filed on or after January 1, 2003: 
 . . .  
The cross-petition, cross-bill, and cross-suit are abolished. Demurrers to a 
pleading and special appearances shall not be used. The plea in bar, plea in 
abatement, and other dilatory pleas shall not be used in civil actions  
 
A district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under 
Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. Civ. Actions 12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo, accepting all the 
allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor 
of the nonmoving party. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should be granted only in 
the unusual case in which a plaintiff includes allegations that show on the face of 
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the complaint that there is some insuperable bar to relief. Johnson v. Johnson, 
272 Neb. 263, 720 N.W.2d 20 (2006). 
 
DICTA: 
 
A case is not authority for any point not necessary to be passed on to decide the 
case, or not specifically raised as an issue addressed by the court. Commerce Sav. 
Scottsbluff v. F.H. Schafer Elev., 231 Neb. 288, 436 N.W.2d 151 (1989). 
 
DIRECTED VERDICT: 
 
In order to sustain a motion for directed verdict, the trial court must resolve the 
controversy as a matter of law and is to do so only when the facts are such that 
reasonable minds can draw only one conclusion; in considering the evidence for 
the purposes of a directed verdict motion, the party against whom the motion is 
made is entitled to have the benefit of every inference which can reasonably be 
drawn from the evidence, and the case may not be decided as a matter of law if 
there is any evidence in favor of the party against whom the motion is made. 
Lindsay Mfg. Co. v. Universal Surety Co., 246 Neb. 495, 519 N.W.2d 530 (1994); 
Baker v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 240 Neb. 14, 480 N.W.2d 192 (1992). 
 
The moving party is deemed to have admitted as true all the material and relevant 
evidence admitted which is favorable to the party against whom the motion is 
directed, and, further, the party against whom the motion is directed is entitled to 
the benefit of all proper inferences which can reasonably be deduced therefrom. 
Baker v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 240 Neb. 14, 480 N.W.2d 192 (1992). 
 
A defendant who moves for a directed verdict at the close of evidence in the 
plaintiff’s case in chief and who, when the court overrules the directed verdict 
motion, proceeds with trial and introduces evidence, waives the appellate right to 
challenge correctness in the trial court’s overruling the motion for directed 
verdict. Baker v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 240 Neb. 14, 480 N.W.2d 
192 (1992); Sikvta v. Arrow Stage Lines, 238 Neb. 289, 470 N.W.2d 724 (1991). 
 
A directed verdict is proper at the close of all the evidence only when reasonable 
minds cannot differ and can draw but one conclusion from the evidence, that is to 
say, when an issue should be decided as a matter of law. Gerhold Concrete Co. v. 
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 269 Neb. 692, 695 N.W.2d 665 (2005). 
 
Denial of a judgment authorized by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315.02 is an appealable 
order. Ditloff v. Otto, 239 Neb. 377, 476 N.W.2d 675 (1991). 
 
DISMISSAL OR NONSUIT: 
 
  
-19-
In a court’s review of evidence on a motion to dismiss, the nonmoving party is 
entitled to have every controverted fact resolved in his favor and to have the 
benefit of every inference which can be reasonably drawn therefrom, and where 
the plaintiff’s evidence meets the burden of proof required and the plaintiff has 
made a prima facie case, the motion to dismiss should be overruled. Knaub v. 
Knaub, 245 Neb. 172, 512 N.W.2d 124 (1994). 
 
On appeal from an order of trial court dismissing an action at the close of 
plaintiff’s evidence, the appellate court must determine whether the cause of 
action was proved and must accept the plaintiff’s evidence as true, together with 
reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence; if there is any evidence in favor 
of the party against whom the motion is made, the case may not be decided as a 
matter of law. Bloomfield v. Nebraska State Bank, 237 Neb. 89, 465 N.W.2d 144 
(1991); Russell v. Norton, 229 Neb. 379, 427 N.W.2d 762 (1988). 
 
 
 
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE: 
 
In actions for dissolution of marriage, an appellate court reviews the case de novo 
on the record to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion by the 
trial judge.  Hosack v. Hosack, 267 Neb. 934, 678 N.W.2d 746 (2004). 
 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: 
 
A suit under an employment contract is an action at law, and this court will 
overturn factual findings of the trial court only if they are clearly wrong. Unland 
v. City of Lincoln, 247 Neb. 837, 530 N.W.2d 624 (1995); Hammond v. City of 
Broken Bow, 239 Neb. 437, 476 N.W.2d 822 (1991). 
 
EQUITY STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
 
We now address the trial court’s decision to vacate its previous order of dismissal 
and reinstate this case outside the court term. We first note that the proper 
standard of review in this case is de novo on the record because the Hornigs 
sought reinstatement pursuant to the district court’s independent equity 
jurisdiction. On appeal, equity actions are reviewed de novo on the record and 
questions of law and fact are determined independently from the trial court’s 
conclusions. Hornig v. Martel Lift Sys., 258 Neb. 764, 606 N.W.2d 764 (2000). 
 
Apparently, there is some confusion as to the applicable standard of review 
because this court has previously stated, “an appellate court will reverse a 
decision on a motion to vacate or modify a judgment only if the litigant shows 
that the district court abused its discretion.” Thrift Mart v. State Farm Fire & 
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Cas. Co., 251 Neb. 448, 451, 558 N.W.2d 531, 535 (1997). In Thrift Mart, 
however, the plaintiffs sought reinstatement of their dismissed case under both 
the trial court’s statutory authority and under its independent equity jurisdiction. 
To the extent that Thrift Mart reviewed the trial court’s refusal to exercise its 
independent equity powers for abuse of discretion, that decision is overruled. 
The correct standard of review for a trial court’s exercise of equity jurisdiction is 
de novo on the record, with independent conclusions of law and fact. Hornig v. 
Martel Lift Sys., 258 Neb. 764, 606 N.W.2d 764 (2000). 
 
ERROR ON THE RECORD STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
 
When reviewing a judgment for errors appearing on the record, the inquiry is 
whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, 
and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. Stover v. County of 
Lancaster, 271 Neb. 107, 710 N.W.2d 84 (2006). 
 
ERROR PROCEEDINGS/PETITIONS IN ERROR Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1901 to 1908 
(not to be confused with error proceedings in criminal cases nor with the abolished writ of 
error, on which, see below): 
 
In an error proceeding to review an administrative agency decision, both the 
district court and the supreme court review the decision of the administrative 
agency to determine whether the agency acted within its jurisdiction and whether 
the decision of the agency is supported by sufficient relevant evidence. Evidence 
supports an administrative agency’s decision reviewed in an error proceeding if 
the agency could reasonably find the facts for the agency’s decision on the basis 
of the relevant evidence contained in the record before the agency. In an error 
proceeding to review an administrative agency’s decision, the reviewing court is 
restricted to the record before the administrative agency and does not reweigh 
evidence or make independent findings of fact. Wagner v. Omaha, 236 Neb. 843, 
464 N.W.2d 175 (1991). 
 
A proceeding in error removes the record from an inferior tribunal to a superior 
tribunal in order for the superior tribunal to determine whether the judgment or 
final order of the inferior tribunal is in accordance with law. Thus, in an error 
proceeding, the district court and the supreme court review the administrative 
agency’s decision with the same standard of review. Id. 
 
A review by petition in error is conducted solely on record made by tribunal 
whose action is being reviewed, and no new facts or evidence can enter into 
consideration of court. Niedbalski v. Board of Education of School District No. 
24 of Platte Center, 227 Neb. 516, 418 N.W.2d 565 (1988). 
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In proceeding in error, if tribunal acted within its jurisdiction and its findings are 
sustained by some competent evidence, its actions must be sustained. Id. 
 
The petition in error statutes allow a judgment rendered or final order made by 
any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions to be reversed, 
vacated, or modified by the district court. Further, a court will construe statutes 
relating to the same subject matter together so as to maintain a consistent and 
sensible scheme. If a conflict exists between two statutes on the same subject 
matter, the special provisions of a statute prevail over the general provisions in 
the same or other statutes. Here, the Legislature considered the Board of 
Supervisors to be an administrative agency and the Board of Adjustment as a 
body that performs judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Thus, by adopting a 
specific method for appeal, the Legislature provided for an appeal specifically 
outside of the petition in error. Accordingly, we determine that an appeal from a 
board of supervisors denying a conditional use permit is to be taken in 
accordance with §§ 23-168.01 to 23-168.04 and not by a petition in error. 
Mogensen v. Bd. of Supervisors, 268 Neb. 26, 679 N.W.2d 413 (2004). 
 
EXPERT WITNESSES: 
 
Generally, a trial court’s ruling in receiving or excluding an expert’s testimony 
which is otherwise relevant will be reversed only when there has been an abuse of 
discretion. John H. Orduna, Jr., v. Total Construction Services, Inc., 271 Neb. 
557; 713 N.W.2d 471 ( 2006); City of Lincoln v. Realty Trust Group, 270 Neb. 
587, 705 N.W.2d 432 (2005); Lantis v. City of Omaha. 237 Neb. 670, 467 
N.W.2d 649 (1990). 
 
Under rule 702, a witness can testify concerning scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge only if the witness is qualified as an expert. Whether a 
witness is qualified as an expert is a preliminary question for the trial court. A 
trial court is allowed discretion in determining whether a witness is qualified to 
testify as an expert, and unless the court’s finding is clearly erroneous, such a 
determination will not be disturbed on appeal. Carlson v. Okerstrom, 267 Neb. 
397, 675 N.W.2d 89 (2004). 
 
Under rule 702, it is not enough that a witness is qualified as an expert. The trial 
court must also act as a gatekeeper to ensure the evidentiary relevance and 
reliability of the expert’s opinion. Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 262 Neb. 215, 
631 N.W.2d 862 (2001). In Schafersman, we rejected the “general acceptance” 
test for determining the admissibility of an expert’s testimony. In its place, we 
adopted the standards set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
509 U.S. 579 (1993), and its progeny, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 
137 (1999), and General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). Carlson v. 
Okerstrom, 267 Neb. 397, 675 N.W.2d 89 (2004). 
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An appellate court reviews the record de novo to determine whether a trial court 
has abdicated its gatekeeping function. When a court is faced with a decision 
regarding the admissibility of expert opinion evidence, the trial judge must 
determine at the outset, in accordance with Neb. Evid. R. 702, whether the expert 
is proposing to testify to (1) scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. A 
trial court adequately demonstrates that it has performed its gatekeeping duty in 
determining the reliability of expert testimony when the record shows (1) the 
court’s conclusion whether the expert’s opinion is admissible and (2) the 
reasoning the court used to reach that conclusion, specifically noting the factors 
bearing on reliability that the court relied on in reaching its determination. A trial 
court may not abdicate its gatekeeping duty under Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 
262 Neb. 215, 631 N.W.2d 862 (2001), in a bench trial, but the court is afforded 
more flexibility in performing this function. Fickle v. State, 273 Neb. 990, ___ 
N.W.2d ___, 2007 Neb. LEXIS 113 (July 20, 2007). 
 
It is not enough for the trial court to determine that an expert’s methodology is 
valid in the abstract. The trial court must also determine if the witness has applied 
the methodology in a reliable manner. Carlson v. Okerstrom, 267 Neb. 397, 675 
N.W.2d 89 (2004). 
 
Whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert under Neb. Evid. R. 702 is a 
preliminary question of admissibility for a trial court under Neb. Evid. R. 104(1). 
Such a determination will be upheld on appeal unless the trial court’s finding is 
clearly erroneous. In re Interest of C.W. et al., 239 Neb. 817, 479 N.W.2d105 
(1992). 
 
We have previously pointed out that expert testimony is relevant and admissible 
only if it tends to help the trier of fact understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact issue and that expert testimony concerning the status of the law does not tend 
to accomplish either of these goals; as a consequence, expert testimony 
concerning a question of law is generally not admissible in evidence. Schmidt v. 
Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 245 Neb. 776, 515 N.W.2d 756 (1994); Kaiser v. 
Western R/C Flyers, 239 Neb. 624, 477 N.W.2d 557 (1991); Sasich v. City of 
Omaha, 216 Neb. 864, 347 N.W.2d 93 (1984); Neb. Evid. R. 401, 402, and 702, 
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 27-401, 27-402, and 27-702 (Reissue 1989). See, also, State v. 
Thomas, 236 Neb. 553, 462 N.W.2d 862 (1990) (expert testimony generally not 
admissible as proof counsel was ineffective). Sports Courts v. Brower, 248 Neb. 
272, 534 N.W.2d 317 (1995). 
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[T]riers of fact, including the Workers’ Compensation Court, are not required to 
take the opinions of expert witnesses as binding. Aken v. Nebraska Methodist 
Hosp., 245 Neb. 161, 511 N.W.2d 762 (1994). 
 
GROUNDS FOR TRIAL COURT'S DECISION: 
 
When the record indicates that the decision of the trial court is correct, although 
for reasons different from those relied upon below, an appellate court will affirm 
the trial court’s decision. Troshynski v. Nebraska State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy, 
270 Neb. 347, 701 N.W.2d 379 (2005); Ev. Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc. v. 
Buffalo County Bd. of Equalization, 243 Neb. 351, 500 N.W.2d 520 (1993). 
 
ISSUES NOT ADDRESSED ON APPEAL: 
 
In disposing of an appeal, the supreme court considers only those errors which 
are properly assigned and presented to the court. Where a cause has been 
appealed to the supreme court from a district court exercising appellate 
jurisdiction, only issues properly presented to and passed upon by the district 
court may be raised on appeal to this court. In the absence of plain error, where 
an issue is raised for the first time in the supreme court, it will be disregarded 
inasmuch as the district court cannot commit error in resolving an issue never 
presented and submitted for disposition. Wagner v. City of Omaha, 236 Neb. 843, 
464 N.W.2d 175 (1991). 
 
An issue not presented to or passed on by the trial court is not appropriate for 
consideration on appeal. Wagner v. City of Omaha, 236 Neb. 843, 464 N.W.2d 
175 (1991). 
 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING VERDICT: 
 
In order to sustain a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the court 
resolves the controversy as a matter of law and may do so only when the facts are 
such that reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion. Critchfield v. 
McNamara, 248 Neb. 39, 532 N.W.2d 287 (1995). 
 
On a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the moving party is 
deemed to have admitted as true all the material and relevant evidence admitted 
which is favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed, and, further, 
the party against whom the motion is directed is entitled to the benefit of all 
proper inferences deducible from the relevant evidence. McWhirt v. Heavey, 250 
Neb. 536, 550 N.W.2d 327 (1996). 
 
A jury verdict will not be disturbed unless it is clearly wrong. McCune v. Neitzel, 
235 Neb. 754, 457 N.W.2d 803(1990). 
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JUDICIAL ABUSE OF DISCRETION: 
 
A judicial abuse of discretion does not denote or imply improper motive, bad 
faith, or intentional wrong by a judge, but requires the reasons or rulings of a trial 
judge to be clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right 
and denying a just result in matters submitted for disposition through a judicial 
system. John P. v. Paula P. (In re Karin P.), 271 Neb. 917, 716 N.W.2d 681 
(2006). Stewart v. Amigo's Restaurant, 240 Neb. 53, 480 N.W.2d 211 (1992); 
Wachtel Bv and Through Wachtel v. Beer, 229 Neb. 392, 427 N.W.2d 56 (1988); 
see also Brooke v. Brooke, 234 Neb. 968, 453 N.W.2d 438 (1990). 
 
JUDICIAL NOTICE: 
 
[T]his court will take judicial notice of general rules and regulations established 
and published by Nebraska state agencies under authority of law. City of Lincoln 
v. Central Platte NRD, 263 Neb. 141, 638 N.W.2d 839 (2002); Morrissey v. 
Department of Motor Vehicles, 264 Neb. 456, 647 N.W.2d 644 (2002). Likewise, 
we will take judicial notice of rules and regulations established and published by 
federal agencies under authority of law. Gase v. Gase, 266 Neb. 975, 671 N.W.2d 
223 (2003). 
 
JURISDICTION: 
 
When determination of a jurisdictional question involves factual findings, a trial 
court’s decision on the question of jurisdiction will be upheld unless the factual 
findings concerning jurisdiction are clearly incorrect. When a jurisdictional 
question does not involve a factual dispute, determination of a jurisdictional issue 
is a matter of law, which requires an appellate court to reach a conclusion 
independent from the trial court’s conclusion on the jurisdictional issue. Williams 
v. Gould, Inc., 232 Neb. 862, 443 N.W.2d 577 (1989). 
 
[W]hether a question is raised by the parties concerning the jurisdiction of a 
lower court or tribunal, it is not only within the power but the duty of an appellate 
court to determine whether such appellate court has jurisdiction over the matter 
before it. . . [W]hen lack of jurisdiction in the original tribunal is apparent on the 
face of the record, yet the parties fail to raise that issue, it is the duty of a 
reviewing court to raise and determine the issue of jurisdiction sua sponte. When 
a trial court lacks the power, that is, jurisdiction, to adjudicate the merits of a 
claim, an appellate court also lacks power to adjudicate the merits of the claim. In 
re Interest of D.M.B., 240 Neb. 349, 481 N.W.2d 905 (1992). 
 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS: 
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In an appeal based on the claim of an erroneous instruction, the appellant has the 
burden to show that the questioned instruction was prejudicial or otherwise 
adversely affected a substantial right of the appellant. Gary’s Implement v. 
Bridgeport Tractor Parts, 270 Neb. 286, 702 N.W.2d 355 (2005); Pugh v. Great 
Plains Ins. Co., 239 Neb. 171, 474 N.W.2d 677 (1991); Sikvta v. Arrow Stage 
Lines, 238 Neb. 289, 470 N.W.2d 724 (1991). 
 
An appellate court will not consider assignments of error pertaining to alleged 
errors in the instructions when the instructions are not included in the record. 
Neb. Ct. R. of Prac. 4A(2); Stoco. Inc. v. Madison's Inc., 235 Neb. 305, 454 
N.W.2d 692 (1990). 
 
Where an examination of the instructions given by the trial court discloses plain 
error indicative of a probable miscarriage of justice, judgment will be reversed in 
favor of remanding case for new trial, even absent a proper objection by counsel. 
Enyeart v. Swartz, 218 Neb. 425, 355 N.W.2d 786 (1984). 
 
JURY VERDICT: 
 
As a general rule, in determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a 
verdict in a civil case, an appellate court considers the evidence most favorably to 
the successful party and resolves evidential conflicts in favor of such party, who 
is entitled to every reasonable inference deducible from the evidence. John H. 
Orduna, Jr., v. Total Construction Services, Inc., 271 Neb. 557; 713 N.W.2d 471 
( 2006); Vanek v. Prohaska, 233 Neb. 848, 448 N.W.2d 573 (1989). 
 
A verdict is not to be set aside where the evidence is in conflict or where 
reasonable minds may reach different conclusions or inferences, as it is within the 
jury’s province to decide issues of fact. Chadron Energy Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank 
of Omaha, 236 Neb. 173, 459 N.W.2d 718 (1990); Commerce Sav. Scottsbluff v. 
F.H. Schafer Elev., 231 Neb. 288, 436 N.W.2d 151 (1989). 
 
A jury verdict may not be set aside unless clearly wrong, and it is sufficient if 
there is any competent evidence presented to the jury upon which it could find for 
the successful party. Commerce Sav. Scottsbluff v. F.H. Schafer Elev., 231 Neb. 
288, 436 N.W.2d 151 (1989). 
 
A jury verdict will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly against weight 
and reasonableness of evidence and so disproportionate as to indicate that it was 
the result of passion, prejudice, mistake, or some means not apparent in record, or 
that jury disregarded evidence or rules of law. Bay v. House, 226 Neb. 521, 412 
N.W.2d 466 (1987) . 
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A verdict based on conflicting evidence will not be set aside unless clearly 
wrong. Janik v. Gatewood, 233 Neb. 298, 444 N.W.2d 900 (1989). 
 
A civil jury verdict will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly wrong. The 
amount of damages to be awarded is a determination solely for the fact finder, 
and its action in this respect will not be disturbed on appeal if it is supported by 
evidence and bears a reasonable relationship to the elements of the damages 
proved. Streeks, Inc. v. Diamond Hill Farms, Inc., 258 Neb. 581, 605 N.W.2d 
110 (2000). 
 
An award of damages may be set aside as inadequate when, and not unless, it is 
so inadequate as to be the result of passion, prejudice, mistake, or some other 
means not apparent in the record. If an award of damages shocks the conscience, 
it necessarily follows that the award was the result of passion, prejudice, mistake, 
or some other means not apparent in the record. Poppe v. Siefker, 274 Neb. 1, ___ 
N.W.2d ___, 2007 Neb. LEXIS 115 (July 27, 2007). 
 
JUVENILE COURT: 
 
On appeal of any final order of a juvenile court, an appellate court tries factual 
questions de novo on the record and is required to reach a conclusion independent 
of the findings of the trial court, but, when the evidence is in conflict, the 
appellate court considers and may give weight to the fact that the trial court 
observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather than another.  
An adjudication order in a juvenile court is an appealable order, and an appeal, if 
not made within 30 days after the order’s entry, will be dismissed. That being 
true, the court ordinarily does not review the validity of an adjudication order in 
the absence of a direct appeal. However, this rule does not apply when the facts 
pleaded and the facts developed at the adjudication hearing are not sufficient for a 
juvenile court to acquire jurisdiction of a juvenile. If the pleadings and evidence 
at the adjudication hearing do not justify a juvenile court’s acquiring jurisdiction 
of a child, then the juvenile court has no jurisdiction, that is, no power, to order a 
parent to comply with a rehabilitation plan, nor does the juvenile court have any 
power over the parent or child at the disposition hearing unless jurisdiction is 
alleged and proven by new facts at a new adjudication-disposition hearing. In re 
Interest of D.M.B., 240 Neb. 349, 481 N.W.2d 905 (1992). 
 
LACK OF PROSECUTION: 
 
Dismissal of a civil action for lack of prosecution is addressed to the discretion of 
a trial court, whose ruling, in the absence of an abuse of discretion, will be upheld 
on appeal. Linch v. Northport Irrigation Dist., 14 Neb. Ct. App. 842, 717 N.W.2d 
522 (2006). 
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Dismissal of a civil action for lack of prosecution is addressed to the discretion of 
a trial court, whose ruling, in the absence of an abuse of discretion, will be upheld 
on appeal. A dismissal for lack of prosecution is without prejudice and does not 
result in a disposition on the merits of a controversy. Billups v. Jade, Inc., 240 
Neb. 494, 482 N.W.2d 269 (1992) . 
 
MISTRIAL: 
 
A motion for mistrial is directed to the discretion of the trial court, and its ruling 
will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of that discretion. 
Genthon v. Kratville, 270 Neb. 74, 701 N.W.2d 334 (2005). 
 
In State v. Groves, 239 Neb. 660, 673, 477 N.W.2d 789, 799 (1991), we stated: 
“The decision as to whether to grant a motion for mistrial is a matter within the 
discretion of the trial court, and such a ruling will be upheld absent an abuse of 
that discretion.” That holding was set out in a criminal case, but we hold it 
applies in a civil case as well.  Bloomquist v. ConAgra, Inc., 240 Neb. 135, 481 
N.W.2d 156 (1992). 
 
A mistrial is properly granted when an event occurs during the course of a trial 
which is of such a nature that its damaging effects cannot be removed by proper 
admonition or instruction to the jury and would thus result in preventing a fair 
trial. Egregiously prejudicial statements of counsel, the improper admission of 
prejudicial evidence, and the introduction to the jury of other incompetent matters 
are examples of occurrences which may constitute such events. . . . Error cannot 
ordinarily be predicated on the failure to grant a mistrial if an objection or motion 
to strike the improper material is sustained and the jury is admonished to 
disregard such  material. State v. Groves, 239 Neb. 660, 477 N.W.2d 789 (1991). 
 
MOOTNESS: 
 
A case becomes moot when the issue initially presented in the litigation cease to 
exist, when the litigants lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of 
litigation, or when the litigants seek to determine a question which does not rest 
upon existing facts or rights, in which the issues presented are no longer alive. In 
the absence of an actual case or controversy requiring judicial resolution, it is not 
the function of the courts to render a judgment that is merely advisory. A court 
decides real controversies and determines rights actually controverted, and does 
not address or dispose of abstract questions or issues that might arise in a 
hypothetical or fictitious situation or setting. An appellate court may choose to 
review an otherwise moot case under the public interest exception if it involves a 
matter affecting the public interest or when other rights or liabilities may be 
affected by its determination. This exception requires a consideration of the 
public or private nature of the question presented, the desirability of an 
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authoritative adjudication for future guidance of public officials, and the 
likelihood of future recurrence of the same or a similar problem. In re 
Applications of Loren W. Koch, 274 Neb. 96, ___ N.W.2d ___ (August 3, 2007). 
 
As a general rule, appellate courts do not sit to give opinions on moot questions 
on abstract propositions, and an appeal will ordinarily be dismissed where no 
actual controversy exists between the parties at the time of the hearing. Koenig v. 
Southeast Community College, 231 Neb. 923, 438 N.W.2d 791 (1989). 
 
Moot case is one which seeks to determine abstract question, which does not rest 
upon existing facts or rights. Mullendore v. School Dist. No. 1 of Lancaster 
County, 223 Neb. 28, 388 N.W.2d 93 (1986). 
 
“Justiciable issue” requires present, substantial controversy between parties 
having adverse legal interests susceptible to immediate resolution and capable of 
present judicial enforcement. Koenig v. Southeast Community College, 231 Neb. 
923, 438 N.W.2d 791 (1989). 
 
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES: 
 
Courts of general jurisdiction will not take judicial notice of municipal 
ordinances not present in the record, nor will appellate courts on appeal. Hawkins 
Const. Co. v. Director, 240 Neb. 1, 480 N.W.2d 183 (1992). 
 
 
 
NEW TRIAL: 
 
A motion for new trial is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and the trial 
court’s decision will be upheld unless it is based upon reasons that are untenable 
or if its action is clearly against justice or conscience, reason, and evidence. 
Genthon v. Kratville, 270 Neb. 74, 701 N.W.2d 334 (2005). 
 
The standard of review of an order granting a new trial is whether the trial court 
abused its discretion. A motion for new trial should be granted only where there 
is error prejudicial to the rights of the unsuccessful party. Unless such error 
appears, a party who has sustained the burden and expense of trial, and who has 
succeeded in securing a verdict on the facts in issue, has a right to keep the 
benefit of that verdict. Kumar v. Douglas County, 234 Neb. 511, 452 N.W.2d 21 
(1990). 
 
A motion for new trial may appropriately be filed only in a trial court. It is 
improper to move for a new trial in a court which reviewed the decision of a 
lower court or administrative agency and thus functioned not as a trial court but 
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as an intermediate court of appeals. It necessarily follows then that the filing of a 
motion for new trial in a court which functioned as an intermediate court of 
appeals does not stop the running of the time within which to perfect an appeal 
from the reviewing court. Booker v. Nebraska State Patrol, 239 Neb. 687, 477 
N.W.2d 583 (1991). 
 
An untimely motion for new trial is ineffectual, does not toll the time for 
perfection of an appeal, and does not extend or suspend the time limit for filing a 
notice of appeal. Metrejean v. Gunter, 240 Neb. 166, 481 N.W.2d 176 (1992). 
 
PLAIN ERROR: 
 
When plain error permeates the entire proceedings, this court may elect to 
conduct a de novo review of the entire record under both its review and 
supervisory powers. In re Interest of D.M.B., 240 Neb. 349, 481 N.W.2d 905 
(1992). “Although an appellate court ordinarily considers only those errors 
assigned and discussed in the briefs, the appellate court may, at its option, notice 
plain error.” In re Interest of D.W., 249 Neb. 133, 134, 542 N.W.2d 407, 408 
(1996). “Plain error is ‘error plainly evident from the record and of such a nature 
that to leave it uncorrected would result in damage to the integrity, reputation, or 
fairness of the judicial process.’” State v. Mercedes S. (In the Interest of Mainor 
T.), 267 Neb. 232, 674 N.W.2d 442 (2004). 
 
Plain error may be asserted for the first time on appeal or be noted by the 
appellate court on its own motion. Katskee v. Nevada Bob’s Golf of Neb., 238 
Neb. 654, 472 N.W.2d 372 (1991). 
 
Plain error may be found on appeal, when an error, unasserted or uncomplained 
of at trial, but plainly evident from the record, prejudicially affects a litigant’s 
substantial right and, if uncorrected, would cause a miscarriage of justice or 
damage the integrity, reputation, and fairness of the judicial process. In re Estate 
of Fischer, 227 Neb. 722, 419 N.W.2d 860 (1988). 
 
POLITICAL SUBDIVISION TORT CLAIMS ACT: 
 
A district court’s factual findings in a case brought under the Political 
Subdivisions Tort Claims Act will not be set aside unless such findings are 
clearly incorrect. Kumar v. Douglas County, 234 Neb. 511, 452 N.W.2d 21 
(1990); Ohnstad v. Omaha Public School District, 232 Neb. 788, 442 N.W.2d 
859 (1989). 
 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST: 
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Prejudgment interest may be awarded only as provided in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 45-
103.02(2) (Reissue 2004), and whether prejudgment interest should be awarded is 
reviewed de novo on appeal. The Travelers Indemnity Company v. International 
Nutrition, Inc., 273 Neb. 943, ___ N.W.2d ___, 2007 Neb. LEXIS 108 (July 13, 
2007); Ferer v. Aaron Ferer & Sons, 272 Neb. 770, 725 N.W.2d 168 (2006).  
 
PROBATE: 
 
An appellate court reviews probate cases for error appearing on the record made 
in the county court. Donley v. Donley (In re Donley), 262 Neb. 282, 631 N.W.2d 
839 (2001). 
 
When reviewing a judgment for errors appearing on the record, the inquiry is 
whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, 
and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. Stover v. County of 
Lancaster, 271 Neb. 107, 710 N.W.2d 84 (2006); John P. v. Paula P. (In re 
Karin P.), 271 Neb. 917, 716 N.W.2d 681 (2006). 
 
In appeal from county court’s decision of probate matter as law action, the 
appellate court reviews the county court’s decision and judgment for error 
appearing on the record in county court. In re Estate of Goltl, 233 Neb. 53, 443 
N.W.2d 884 (1989). 
 
An appeal from the allowance of a claim in probate is tried as an action at law. In 
re Estate of Krueger, 235 Neb. 518, 455 N.W.2d 809 (1990). 
 
 
 
QUESTIONS OF LAW: 
 
When reviewing questions of law, an appellate court has an obligation to resolve 
the questions independently of the conclusion reached by the trial court. Worth v. 
Kolbeck, 273 Neb. 163, 728 N.W.2d 282 (2007). 
 
RES JUDICATA: 
 
The applicability of the doctrine of res judicata is a question of law. On questions 
of law, an appellate court is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the 
determination reached by the court below. Ichtertz v. Orthopaedic Specialists of 
Neb., P.C., 273 Neb. 466, 730 N.W.2d 798 (2007); Eicher v. Mid America Fin. 
Invest. Corp., 270 Neb. 370, 702 N.W.2d 792 (2005). 
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An appellate court is not precluded from raising the issue of res judicata sua 
sponte, although it is infrequently done. Dakota Title v. World-Wide Steel 
Systems, Inc., 238 Neb. 519, 471 N.W.2d 430 (1991). 
 
RULE 12(b)(6) MOTIONS: 
 
Compare former rule re demurrers: When a demurrer to a petition is sustained, a 
court must grant leave to amend the petition unless it is clear that no reasonable 
possibility exists that amendment will correct the defect. Northwall v. State, 263 
Neb. 1, 637 N.W.2d 890 (2002). 
 
An appellate court reviews de novo a lower court’s dismissal of a complaint for 
failure to state a claim. . . . Because a rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal 
sufficiency of the complaint, not the claim’s substantive merits, a court may 
typically look only at the face of the complaint to decide a motion to dismiss. . . . 
Dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) should be granted only in the unusual case in which 
a plaintiff includes allegations that show on the face of the complaint that there is 
some insuperable bar to relief. . . . When analyzing a lower court’s dismissal of a 
complaint for failure to state a claim, an appellate court accepts the complaint’s 
factual allegations as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff. Ichtertz v. Orthopaedic Specialists of Neb., P.C., 273 Neb. 466, 730 
N.W.2d 798 (2007); Doe v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 273 Neb. 79, 727 N.W.2d 
447 (2007). 
 
Rule 12(b) provides that when matters outside the pleadings are presented by the 
parties and accepted by the trial court with respect to a motion to dismiss under 
rule 12(b)(6), the motion “shall be treated” as a motion for summary judgment as 
provided in Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1330 to 25-1336 (Reissue 1995 & Cum. Supp. 
2006) and the parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all 
pertinent material. Ichtertz v. Orthopaedic Specialists of Neb., P.C., 273 Neb. 
466, 730 N.W.2d 798 (2007); Doe v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 273 Neb. 79, 727 
N.W.2d 447 (2007). 
 
Under our current notice pleading rules, by receiving and considering matters 
outside the pleadings, the district court converted the motion to dismiss into a 
motion for summary judgment. Our rules concerning pleadings in civil actions 
are modeled after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and we look to federal 
decisions for guidance. See Kellogg v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 269 Neb. 
40, 690 N.W.2d 574 (2005). The principle recognized by federal courts is that 
when a court receives evidence which converts a motion to dismiss into a motion 
for summary judgment, it is important for the trial court to “‘give the parties 
notice of the changed status of the motion and a “reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion.”’” See Doe, 273 Neb. at 83, 
727 N.W.2d at 452-53, quoting 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
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Federal Practice and Procedure § 1366 (3d ed. 2004). See, e.g., Country Club 
Estates, L.L.C. v. Town of Loma Linda, 213 F.3d 1001 (8th Cir. 2000). Ichtertz v. 
Orthopaedic Specialists of Neb., P.C., 273 Neb. 466, 730 N.W.2d 798 (2007) 
 
Federal courts have also noted that when a motion to dismiss is converted to a 
motion for summary judgment, reversal of the “ruling may become necessary if 
the district court has not provided the adversely affected party with notice and an 
opportunity to respond.” Alioto v. Marshall Field's & Co., 77 F.3d 934, 936 (7th 
Cir. 1996). “The primary vice of unexpected conversion to summary judgment is 
that it denies the surprised party sufficient opportunity to discover and bring 
forward factual matters which may become relevant only in the summary 
judgment, and not the dismissal, context.” Portland Retail, etc. v. Kaiser 
Foundation, etc., 662 F.2d 641, 645 (9th Cir. 1981). Ichtertz v. Orthopaedic 
Specialists of Neb., P.C., 273 Neb. 466, 730 N.W.2d 798 (2007). 
 
STANDING: 
 
Standing is a jurisdictional component of a party’s case because only a party who 
has standing may invoke the jurisdiction of a court; determination of a 
jurisdictional issue which does not involve a factual dispute is a matter of law 
which requires an appellate court to reach an independent conclusion. County of 
Sarpy v. City of Gretna, 267 Neb. 943, 678 N.W.2d 740 (2004). 
 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: 
 
Which statute of limitations applies is a question of law that an appellate court 
must decide independently of the conclusion reached by the trial court. Nuss ex 
rel. Nuss v. Alexander, 269 Neb. 101, 691 N.W.2d 94 (2005). 
 
The point at which a statute of limitations begins to run must be determined from 
the facts of each case, and the decision of the district court on the issue of the 
statute of limitations normally will not be set aside by an appellate court unless 
clearly wrong. Reinke Mfg. Co. v. Hayes, 256 Neb. 442, 590 N.W.2d 380 (1999). 
 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: 
 
The general rules governing statutory construction and interpretation provide that 
in the absence of anything indicating to the contrary, statutory language is to be 
given its plain and ordinary meaning; this court will not resort to interpretation to 
ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and 
unambiguous. Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 239 Neb. 579, 477 N.W.2d 8 
(1991). 
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Furthermore, it is not within the province of this court to read a meaning into a 
statute which is not warranted by the legislative language; neither is it within the 
province of this court to read anything plain, direct, and unambiguous out of the 
statute. In construing a statute it is presumed that the Legislature intended a 
sensible rather than an absurd result. Matrisciano v. Board of Education, 236 
Neb. 133, 459 N.W.2d 230 (1990); Houska v. City of Wahoo, 235 Neb. 635, 456 
N.W.2d 750 (1990); Weimer v. Amen, 235 Neb. 287, 455 N.W.2d 145 (1990). 
 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 
 
Statutory interpretation is a matter of law in connection with which this court has 
an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the 
determination made by the court below. Sorensen v. City of Omaha, 230 Neb. 
286, 430 N.W.2d 696 (1988). 
 
When statutory language is plain and unambiguous, no judicial interpretation is 
needed to ascertain the statute's meaning so that, in the absence of a statutory 
indication to the contrary, words in a statute will be given their ordinary meaning. 
State Bd. of Aq. v. State Racing Comm., 239 Neb. 762, 478 N.W.2d 270 (1992). 
 
STIPULATED FACTS: 
 
In a case in which the facts are stipulated, an appellate court reviews the case as if 
trying it originally in order to determine whether the facts warranted the 
judgment. Jindra v. Clayton, 247 Neb. 597, 529 N.W.2d 523 (1995); Douglas 
Cty. Bank & Trust v. Stamper, 244 Neb. 226, 505 N.W.2d 693 (1993); Dobias v. 
Service Life Ins. Co., 238 Neb. 87, 469 N.W.2d 143 (1991). 
 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT: 
 
[T]he denial of a summary judgment motion is neither appealable nor reviewable. 
Moyer v. Nebraska City Airport Auth., 265 Neb. 201, 208, 655 N.W.2d 855, 862 
(2003)  
A denial of a motion for summary judgment is not a final order and therefore is 
not appealable. Keystone Ranch Co. v. Central Nebraska Public Power and Irr. 
Dist.. 237 Neb. 188, 465 N.W.2d 472 (1991); Kimco Additions Inc. v. Lower 
Platte South Natural Resources District, 232 Neb. 289, 440 N.W.2d 456 (1989). 
 
In appellate review of a summary judgment, the court views the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment is granted and gives 
such party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence. 
Spittler v. Nicola, 239 Neb. 972, 479 N.W.2d 803 (1992). 
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Whether partial summary judgment is final and appealable order depends upon its 
effect. Larsen v. Ralston Bank, 236 Neb. 880, 464 N.W.2d 329 (1991). 
 
Where all of plaintiff’s theories are based on same operative facts and involve 
same parties, summary judgment with regard to only some theories does not 
constitute final, appealable order which Supreme Court may consider. Lewis v. 
Craig, 236 Neb. 602, 463 N.W.2d 318 (1990). 
 
THEORY OF APPEAL: 
 
As a general rule, an appellate court disposes of a case on the theory presented in 
the district court. Likewise, an issue not presented to or decided by the trial court 
is not appropriate for consideration on appeal. Kubik v. Kubik, 268 Neb. 337, 683 
N.W.2d 330 (2004). 
 
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE: 
 
In our judicial system, it is entirely within the province of the jury to weigh the 
evidence and resolve the resulting conflicts. Chadron Energy v. First National 
Bank Corp. of Omaha, 236 Neb. 173, 459 N.W.2d 718 (1990). 
 
WRITS OF ERROR ABOLISHED: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1930. 
 
ZONING: 
 
On appeal, a district court may disturb the decision of a zoning appeals board 
only when the decision was illegal or is not supported by the evidence and is thus 
arbitrary, unreasonable, or clearly wrong. In reviewing a decision of the district 
court regarding a zoning appeal, the standard of review is whether the district 
court abused its discretion or made an error of law. Lamar Co. of Neb., L.L.C. v. 
Omaha Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 271 Neb. 473, 713 N.W.2d 406 (2006). 
 
A district court may disturb the decision of a board of adjustment if the decision 
was illegal or is not supported by the evidence and is thus arbitrary, unreasonable, 
or clearly wrong. In deciding whether a board’s decision is supported by the 
evidence, the district court shall consider any additional evidence it receives. In 
appeals involving a decision of a board of adjustment, an appellate court reviews 
the decision of the district court, and irrespective of whether the district court 
took additional evidence, the appellate court is to decide if, in reviewing a 
decision of a board of adjustment, the district court abused its discretion or made 
an error of law. Where competent evidence supports the district court’s factual 
findings, the appellate court will not substitute its factual findings for those of the 
district court. Hanchera v. Bd. of Adjustment, 269 Neb. 623, 694 N.W.2d 641 
(2005). 
  
-35-
 
An appeal from a board of supervisors or board of commissioners denying a 
conditional use permit must be taken in accordance with Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 23-
168.01 to 23-168.04 (Reissue 1997) and not by a petition in error. Gabel v. Polk 
County, 269 Neb. 714, 695 N.W.2d 433 (2005). 
 
Courts will generally presume that legislative or rulemaking bodies, in enacting 
ordinances or rules,  acted within their authority and that the burden rests on 
those who challenge their validity. The validity of a zoning ordinance must be 
determined by an examination of the facts presented in the particular case. This 
court gives great deference to a city’s determination of which laws should be 
enacted for the welfare of the people. When the city rezones a parcel of property, 
we presume the validity of that action absent clear and satisfactory evidence to 
the contrary. When the city considers a request for rezoning based upon a plan or 
representation by the developer, it is presumed that the city grants the request 
after making the determination that the plan as represented is in the interest of 
public health, safety, morals, and the general welfare. Smith v. City of Papillion, 
270 Neb. 607, 705 N.W.2d 584 (2005). 
 
Where the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes is fairly 
debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control. Giger v. City of 
Omaha, 232 Neb. 676, 442 N.W.2d 182 (1989). 
